Authors
Radek Trnka
Prague College Of Psychosocial Studies
Peter Tavel
Palacky University
Abstract
The widely accepted two-dimensional circumplex model of emotions posits that most instances of human emotional experience can be understood within the two general dimensions of valence and activation. Currently, this model is facing some criticism, because complex emotions in particular are hard to define within only these two general dimensions. The present theory-driven study introduces an innovative analytical approach working in a way other than the conventional, two-dimensional paradigm. The main goal was to map and project semantic emotion space in terms of mutual positions of various emotion prototypical categories. Participants (N = 187; 54.5% females) judged 16 discrete emotions in terms of valence, intensity, controllability and utility. The results revealed that these four dimensional input measures were uncorrelated. This implies that valence, intensity, controllability and utility represented clearly different qualities of discrete emotions in the judgments of the participants. Based on this data, we constructed a 3D hypercube-projection and compared it with various two-dimensional projections. This contrasting enabled us to detect several sources of bias when working with the traditional, two-dimensional analytical approach. Contrasting two-dimensional and three-dimensional projections revealed that the 2D models provided biased insights about how emotions are conceptually related to one another along multiple dimensions. The results of the present study point out the reductionist nature of the two-dimensional paradigm in the psychological theory of emotions and challenge the widely accepted circumplex model.
Keywords mental states and processes  emotions  theories of emotion  philosophy of mind  language  multidimensionality
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00522
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What Are Emotions? And How Can They Be Measured?Klaus R. Scherer - 2005 - Social Science Information 44 (4):695-729.
Facts and Values in Emotional Plasticity.Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet - 2008 - In Louis Charland & Peter Zachar (eds.), Fact and Value in Emotion. John Benjamins. pp. 101--137.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Meaning and Emotion.Eva-Maria Engelen - 2012 - In Paul A. Wilson (ed.), Dynamicity in Emotion Concepts. Peter Lang. pp. 61-72.
Against Basic Emotions, and Toward a Comprehensive Theory.Marc A. Cohen - 2005 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4):229-254.
Emotions on a Continuum.David D. Franks - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (2):105-106.
Emotions: A Philosophical Study.Dana Robert Flint - 1981 - Dissertation, Temple University
An Anti‐Essentialist View of the Emotions.Joel J. Kupperman - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):341-351.
Emotion and Action.Jing Zhu & Paul Thagard - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):19 – 36.
The SPAARS Approach: Implications for Psychopathy.Neha Khetrapal - 2008 - Poiesis and Praxis 6 (3-4):131-138.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-06-30

Total views
122 ( #95,674 of 2,505,164 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #90,706 of 2,505,164 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes