Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):285-312 (2010)

Authors
Rebecca Copenhaver
Washington University in St. Louis
Abstract
Thomas Reid's distinction between original and acquired perception is not merely metaphysical; it has psychological and phenomenological stories to tell. Psychologically, acquired perception provides increased sensitivity to features in the environment. Phenomenologically, Reid's theory resists the notion that original perception is exhaustive of perceptual experience. James Van Cleve has argued that most cases of acquired perception do not count as perception and so do not pose a threat to Reid's direct realism. I argue that acquired perception is genuine perception and as direct as original perception. Perception is grounded in a productive and developing relationship between the mind and world
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01368.x
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Revisiting the Early Modern Philosophical Canon.Lisa Shapiro - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (3):365-383.
Perceptual and Imaginative Conception: The Distinction Reid Missed.Marina Folescu - 2015 - In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 52-74.
Spinoza and the Feeling of Freedom.Galen Barry - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):1-15.

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