Authors
Elizabeth Tropman
Colorado State University
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to defend moral intuitionism, in its new formulations, against the criticism that there is something objectionably non-natural about its conception of moral properties. The force of this complaint depends crucially on what it means to be a non-natural property. I consider a number of ways of drawing the natural/non-natural distinction and argue that, once the notion of 'non-natural property' is sufficiently clarified, it fails to figure in a compelling argument against moral intuitionism.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 1053-8364
DOI 10.5840/jpr_2008_1
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Renewing Moral Intuitionism.Elizabeth Tropman - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463.

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