Acta Analytica 26 (4):355-366 (2011)
AbstractIn a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed a novel argument against moral intuitionism. I suggest a defense on behalf of the intuitionist against Sinnott-Armstrong’s objections. Rather than focus on the main premises of his argument, I instead examine the way in which Sinnott-Armstrong construes the intuitionistic position. I claim that Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of intuitionism is mistaken. In particular, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong mischaracterizes non-inferentiality as it figures in intuitionism. To the extent that Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of intuitionism has been adopted by others uncritically, intuitionists have cause for concern. I develop an alternative, and more accurate, reading of what is non-inferential about intuitionistic moral knowledge. In light of this alternative reading, certain elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s case against intuitionism are significantly weakened. But perhaps more importantly, this paper helps clarify what circumspect intuitionists mean when they claim that some moral knowledge is non-inferential
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Citations of this work
Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.
Moral Intuitionism Defeated?Nathan Ballantyne & Joshua C. Thurow - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):411-422.
Do Psychological Defeaters Undermine Foundationalism in Moral Epistemology? - a Critique of Sinnott-Armstrong’s Argument Against Ethical Intuitionism.Philipp Schwind - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):941-952.
Sinnott‐Armstrong Meets Modest Epistemological Intuitionism.Hossein Dabbagh - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (2):175-199.
Sinnott-Armstrong’s Empirical Challenge to Moral Intuitionism: A Novel Critique.Julia Hermann - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):829-842.
References found in this work
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.