Acta Analytica 26 (4):355-366 (2011)

Elizabeth Tropman
Colorado State University
In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed a novel argument against moral intuitionism. I suggest a defense on behalf of the intuitionist against Sinnott-Armstrong’s objections. Rather than focus on the main premises of his argument, I instead examine the way in which Sinnott-Armstrong construes the intuitionistic position. I claim that Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of intuitionism is mistaken. In particular, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong mischaracterizes non-inferentiality as it figures in intuitionism. To the extent that Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of intuitionism has been adopted by others uncritically, intuitionists have cause for concern. I develop an alternative, and more accurate, reading of what is non-inferential about intuitionistic moral knowledge. In light of this alternative reading, certain elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s case against intuitionism are significantly weakened. But perhaps more importantly, this paper helps clarify what circumspect intuitionists mean when they claim that some moral knowledge is non-inferential
Keywords Ethics  Intuitionism  Intuition  Moral knowledge  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0126-0
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
The Right and the Good.Some Problems in Ethics.W. D. Ross & H. W. B. Joseph - 1933 - Journal of Philosophy 30 (19):517-527.
The Structure of Justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.
Moral Intuitionism Defeated?Nathan Ballantyne & Joshua C. Thurow - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):411-422.

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Renewing Moral Intuitionism.Elizabeth Tropman - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463.


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