Philosophical Studies 143 (2):147-165 (2009)
A major stumbling block for non-reductive physicalism is Kim’s disjunctive property objection. In this paper I bring certain issues in sparse ontology to bear on the objection, in particular the theses of priority monism and priority pluralism. Priority pluralism (or something close to it, anyway) is a common ontological background assumption, so in the first part of the paper I consider whether the disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on the assumption that priority monism is instead true. I ultimately conclude that non-reductive physicalism still faces a comparable problem. In the second part, I argue, surprisingly enough, that what I call ‘fine-grained reductionism’, a particular version of which Kim proposes as an alternative to non-reductive physicalism, may work better in the monist framework than the pluralist one. I conclude that issues in sparse ontology, therefore, are more relevant to the debate about physicalism than one may have thought.
|Keywords||Physicalism Sparse ontology Monism Pluralism Intrinsicality Realization Distribution Ontological dependence|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Causal Exclusion and Overdetermination.Markus E. Schlosser - 2006 - In E. Di Nucci & J. McHugh (eds.), Content, Consciousness and Perception. Cambridge Scholars Press.
The Significance of Emergence.Tim Crane - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
Intrinsicality for Monists (and Pluralists).Kelly Trogdon - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):555-558.
The Limitations of Kim's Reductive Physicalism in Accounting for Living Systems and an Alternative Nonreductionist Ontology.Slobodan Perovic - 2007 - Acta Biotheoretica 55 (3):243-267.
New Hope for Non-Reductive Physicalism.Julie Yoo - 2008 - In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitget (eds.), Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium: Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences.
Monism and Intrinsicality.Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):127 – 148.
Ontological Physicalism and Property Pluralism: Why They Are Incompatible.Robert Francescotti - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (4):349-362.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads152 ( #30,306 of 2,158,237 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #38,007 of 2,158,237 )
How can I increase my downloads?