Physicalism and sparse ontology

Philosophical Studies 143 (2):147-165 (2009)
Abstract
A major stumbling block for non-reductive physicalism is Kim’s disjunctive property objection. In this paper I bring certain issues in sparse ontology to bear on the objection, in particular the theses of priority monism and priority pluralism. Priority pluralism (or something close to it, anyway) is a common ontological background assumption, so in the first part of the paper I consider whether the disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on the assumption that priority monism is instead true. I ultimately conclude that non-reductive physicalism still faces a comparable problem. In the second part, I argue, surprisingly enough, that what I call ‘fine-grained reductionism’, a particular version of which Kim proposes as an alternative to non-reductive physicalism, may work better in the monist framework than the pluralist one. I conclude that issues in sparse ontology, therefore, are more relevant to the debate about physicalism than one may have thought.
Keywords Physicalism  Sparse ontology  Monism  Pluralism  Intrinsicality  Realization  Distribution  Ontological dependence
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9196-7
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References found in this work BETA
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
Is There a Fundamental Level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.
Purple Haze.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Monism, Emergence, and Plural Logic.Einar Duenger Bohn - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):211-223.

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