Renewing Moral Intuitionism

Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463 (2009)
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Abstract

According to moral intuitionism, moral properties are objective, but our cognitions of them are not always based on premises. In this paper, I develop a novel version of moral intuitionism and argue that this new intuitionism is worthy of closer attention. The intuitionistic theory I propose, while inspired by the early twentieth-century intuitionism of W. D. Ross, avoids the alleged errors of his view. Furthermore, unlike Robert Audi's contemporary formulation of intuitionism, my theory has the resources to account for the noninferential character of particular, as opposed to merely general, moral beliefs. I achieve this result by avoiding the appeal to self-evidence to explain the possibility of noninferential moral knowledge.

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Elizabeth Tropman
Colorado State University

References found in this work

.Peter Railton - 1985 - Rowman & Littlefield.
Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1985 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1984 - In David Copp & David Zimmerman (eds.), Morality, Reason and Truth. Totowa, NJ: pp. 49-78.
Self-evidence.Robert Audi - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:205-228.

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