Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463 (2009)

Authors
Elizabeth Tropman
Colorado State University
Abstract
According to moral intuitionism, moral properties are objective, but our cognitions of them are not always based on premises. In this paper, I develop a novel version of moral intuitionism and argue that this new intuitionism is worthy of closer attention. The intuitionistic theory I propose, while inspired by the early twentieth-century intuitionism of W. D. Ross, avoids the alleged errors of his view. Furthermore, unlike Robert Audi's contemporary formulation of intuitionism, my theory has the resources to account for the noninferential character of particular, as opposed to merely general, moral beliefs. I achieve this result by avoiding the appeal to self-evidence to explain the possibility of noninferential moral knowledge.
Keywords SELF-EVIDENCE   ROBERT AUDI   W.D. ROSS   MORAL INTUITIONISM   PROTOTYPES   MORAL KNOWLEDGE
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DOI 10.1163/174046809X12464327133096
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Explanations.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 1985 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Self-Evidence.Robert Audi - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:205-228.
Natural Categories.Eleanor Rosch - 1973 - Cognitive Psychology 4 (3):328-350.
The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics.W. D. Ross - 1927 - International Journal of Ethics 37 (2):113-127.

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