Disputatio 4 (33):459-467 (2012)

Elizabeth Tropman
Colorado State University
According to rationalists about moral knowledge, some moral truths are knowable a priori. Rationalists often defend their position by claiming that some moral propositions are self-evidently true. Copp 2007 has recently challenged this rationalist strategy. Copp argues that even if some moral propositions are self-evident, this is not enough to secure rationalism about moral knowledge, since it turns out that such self-evident propositions are only knowable a posteriori. This paper considers the merits of Copp’s challenge. After clarifying the rationalists’ appeal to self-evidence, I show why this rationalist strategy survives Copp’s challenges to it.
Keywords Moral knowledge  self-evidence
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DOI 10.2478/disp-2012-0011
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Analyticity Reconsidered.Paul Boghossian - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
Moral Realism: A Defense.Mark Timmons - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):265-269.

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