Theoria 80 (2):184-190 (2014)

Authors
Elizabeth Tropman
Colorado State University
Abstract
According to Cornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts in much the same way that we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. In “Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?” (2012), I argue that this positive comparison to scientific knowledge hurts, rather than helps, the moral realist position. Joseph Long has recently defended Cornell moral realism against my concerns. In this article, I respond to Long's arguments and clarify important issues in the present debate.
Keywords Cornell moral realism  ethics  moral knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12044
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References found in this work BETA

Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ethical Reductionism.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):32-52.
No Excuses for Moral Realism.Hanno Sauer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):553-578.

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