Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge

Theoria 80 (2):184-190 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to Cornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts in much the same way that we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. In “Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?” (2012), I argue that this positive comparison to scientific knowledge hurts, rather than helps, the moral realist position. Joseph Long has recently defended Cornell moral realism against my concerns. In this article, I respond to Long's arguments and clarify important issues in the present debate.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,642

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-04-08

Downloads
9 (#449,242)

6 months
120 (#147,544)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Elizabeth Tropman
Colorado State University

Citations of this work

Ethical Reductionism.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):32-52.
No excuses for moral realism.Hanno Sauer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):553-578.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
“How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on moral realism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
A Priori Justification.Albert Casullo - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.

View all 11 references / Add more references