A Paradigm for Your Thoughts: A Kuhnian Analysis of Expertise

Humana Mente 8 (28) (2015)

Abstract
It will be argued that the “problem of demarcation” and the defining of “expertise” share common structural features that can lead to either a type of strong relativism or ultra-scepticism. Appropriating notions from Thomas Kuhn’s. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions it will be argued that an “expert” in a field that has a dominant paradigm is different to an “expert” in a field that has multiple competing paradigms. To illustrate my argument I will look at the field of economics and the competing claims of experts over the likelihood of a global recession circa 2005. To this I will apply Goldman’s criteria for expertise assessment and by-way of a hypothetical non-expert show that this criteria becomes deficient in expertise assessment if we only hold to what I have called a “methodological” definition of expertise. I will also introduce the notion of the “anti-expert” who is an equivalent expert, but their whole field is dependent upon the dominant paradigm for its meaning. That is, its existence is parasitic upon the success of the paradigm, rather than as a “revolutionary science” which looks to overthrown or change the paradigm.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 43,822
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Conjectures and Refutations.K. Popper - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (57):377-379.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
Rethinking Expertise.H. M. Collins & Robert Evans - 2007 - University of Chicago Press.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moral Expertise: Judgment, Practice, and Analysis*: Julia Driver.Julia Driver - 2013 - Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):280-296.
Authenticating Expertise: Philosophical and Legal Issues.Jason Borenstein - 2002 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 16 (1):85-102.
Expert Systems.Ronald Stamper, James Backhouse & Karl Althaus - 1987 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 3 (1-2):317-340.
Philosophical and Psychological Accounts of Expertise and Experts.Matt Stichter - 2015 - Humana.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 28:105-128.
The Possibility of Ethical Expertise.Bruce D. Weinstein - 1994 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 15 (1):1-187.
Against a “Mindless” Account of Perceptual Expertise.Amit Chaturvedi - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):509-531.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-06-07

Total views
3 ( #1,179,032 of 2,265,171 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #447,493 of 2,265,171 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes

Sign in to use this feature