Erkenntnis 78 (4):823-832 (2013)
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Abstract |
Horwich has attempted to combine an anti-reductionist deflationism about sentential truth with a reductionist theory of meaning. Price has argued that this combination is inconsistent, but his argument is fallacious. In this paper I attempt to repair Price’s argument
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DOI | 10.1007/s10670-011-9359-y |
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Global expressivism as global subjectivism.Lionel Shapiro - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):777-799.
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