The concept horse with no name

Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1889-1906 (2015)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that Frege’s concept horse paradox is not easily avoided. I do so without appealing to Wright’s Reference Principle. I then use this result to show that Hale and Wright’s recent attempts to avoid this paradox by rejecting or otherwise defanging the Reference Principle are unsuccessful

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Robert Trueman
University of York

Citations of this work

Against Second-Order Primitivism.Bryan Pickel - 2024 - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
A fictionalist theory of universals.Tim Button & Robert Trueman - 2024 - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Engineering Existence?Lukas Skiba - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
A Higher-Order Solution to the Problem of the Concept Horse.Nicholas K. Jones - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
Substitution in a sense.Robert Trueman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3069-3098.

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References found in this work

Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1956 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 12 (1):109-110.
The Frege reader.Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) - 1997 - Cambridge: Blackwell.

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