Linguistic Know-How: The Limits of Intellectualism

Theoria 77 (1):71-86 (2011)
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Abstract

In “Knowing How”, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) propose an intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which all knowledge-how is a type of propositional knowledge about ways to act. In this article, I examine this intellectualist account by applying it to the epistemology of language. I argue that (a) Stanley and Williamson mischaracterize the concept of knowledge-how in the epistemology of language, and (b) intellectualism about knowledge of language fails in its explanatory task. One lesson that can be drawn from this case study is that Stanley and Williamson's intellectualism is limited in its explanatory scope and power insofar as it cannot explain the knowledge of language, which is usually conceived as knowledge-how and as non-propositional in character. Their intellectualist claim that all knowledge-how is knowledge-that should be withdrawn.

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Cheng-hung Tsai
Academia Sinica, Taiwan

Citations of this work

Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.
Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
The Value of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):503-520.
The metaepistemology of knowing-how.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556.
Meno, Know-How: Oh No, What Now?Stephen Kearns - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):421-434.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use.Noam Chomsky - 1986 - Prager. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
The logical basis of metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
New horizons in the study of language and mind.Noam Chomsky - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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