Theoria 77 (1):71-86 (2011)

Authors
Cheng-hung Tsai
Academia Sinica, Taiwan
Abstract
In “Knowing How”, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) propose an intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which all knowledge-how is a type of propositional knowledge about ways to act. In this article, I examine this intellectualist account by applying it to the epistemology of language. I argue that (a) Stanley and Williamson mischaracterize the concept of knowledge-how in the epistemology of language, and (b) intellectualism about knowledge of language fails in its explanatory task. One lesson that can be drawn from this case study is that Stanley and Williamson's intellectualism is limited in its explanatory scope and power insofar as it cannot explain the knowledge of language, which is usually conceived as knowledge-how and as non-propositional in character. Their intellectualist claim that all knowledge-how is knowledge-that should be withdrawn.
Keywords knowledge-how  knowledge-that  practical ability  regress argument
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01091.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
The Seas of Language.Michael Dummett - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Lowenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.
The Value of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):503-520.
The Metaepistemology of Knowing-How.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556.
Meno, Know-How: Oh No, What Now?Stephen Kearns - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):421-434.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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