Is Moral Perception Essentially Rule-Governed? A Critical Assessment of Generalism and a Limited Defense of Particularism

Critica 52 (156) (2021)
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Abstract

Moral perception, for the purposes of this article, is taken to be the perception of moral properties, unless contexts dictate otherwise. While both particularists and generalists agree that we can perceive the moral properties of an action or a feature, they disagree, however, over whether rules play any essential role in moral perception. The particularists argue for a ‘no’ answer, whereas the generalists say ‘yes’. In this paper, I provide a limited defense of particularism by rebutting several powerful generalist arguments. It is hoped particularism can thus be made more attractive as a theory of moral perception. Positive arguments for particularism will also be provided along the way

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Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu
National Chung Cheng University

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References found in this work

Virtue and Reason.John Mcdowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
The practice of moral judgment.Barbara Herman - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (8):414-436.
Principled ethics: generalism as a regulative ideal.Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Michael R. Ridge.
Non-cognitivism and rule-following.John McDowell - 1981 - In Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge. pp. 141--62.

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