teleological theories of mental content

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2004)
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Karen Neander
Duke University
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Proper Function and Recent Selection.Peter H. Schwartz - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):210-222.

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Rescuing Tracking Theories of Morality.Marc Artiga - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3357-3374.

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