Philosophy Compass 5 (8):656-666 (2010)

Authors
Ariela Tubert
University of Puget Sound
Abstract
Can the question "Why do what morality requires?" be answered in such a way that anyone regardless of their desires or interests has reason to be moral? One strategy for answering this question appeals to constitutive arguments. In general, constitutive arguments attempt to establish the normativity of rational requirements by pointing out that we are already committed to them insofar as we are believers or agents. This study is concerned with the general prospects for such arguments. It starts by explaining the general constitutive argument strategy, followed by an examination of constitutive arguments that have been given regarding theoretical reason and the instrumental principle in practical reason, and concluding with a discussion of some challenges to constitutive arguments in moral philosophy and some possible responses to these challenges.
Keywords constitutivism  practical reason  normativity  instrumental principle  agency  Kant  Korsgaard  Velleman  constitutive arguments  why be moral
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00318.x
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References found in this work BETA

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Possibility of Altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford Clarendon Press.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.

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Citations of this work BETA

Constitutivism About Practical Reasons.Paul Katsafanas - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 367-394.
Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.
Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Objectivity.Sem de Maagt - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (5):443-465.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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