In Michael Bergmann & Brett Coppenger (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 43-60 (2016)

Authors
Chris Tucker
William & Mary
Abstract
Classical acquaintance theory is any version of classical foundationalism that appeals to acquaintance in order to account for non-inferential justification. Such theories are well suited to account for a kind of infallible non-inferential justification. Why am I justified in believing that I’m in pain? An initially attractive (partial) answer is that I’m acquainted with my pain. But since I can’t be acquainted with what isn’t there, acquaintance with my pain guarantees that I’m in pain. What’s less clear is whether, given classical acquaintance theory, it’s possible to have non-inferential justification to believe something false. Classical acquaintance theorists try to make room for such a possibility, but I argue that the attempts of Richard Fumerton, Ali Hasan, and Evan Fales are inadequate. I’ll focus on introspective justification, but similar issues arise for a priori justification as well.
Keywords acquaintance  Richard Fumerton  classical foundationalism  introspection  non-inferential justification  misleading justification
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References found in this work BETA

Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
The Incoherence of Empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.
The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification.Peter Markie - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):347-373.
Metaepistemology and Skepticism.Stewart Cohen - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):913-918.
A Defense of the Given.Evan M. Fales - 1996 - Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.

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