Faith and Philosophy 37 (1):32-56 (2020)

Authors
Chris Tucker
William & Mary
Abstract
This paper accomplishes three goals. First, it reveals that God’s ethics has a radical satisficing structure: God can choose a good enough suboptimal option even if there is a best option and no countervailing considerations. Second, it resolves the long-standing worry that there is no account of the good enough that is both principled and demanding enough to be good enough. Third, it vindicates the key ethical assumption in the problem of evil without relying on the contested assumption that God’s ethics is our ethics.
Keywords satisficing  good enough  problem of evil  full goodness  Mark Murphy  divine reasons  divine satisficing  meta-axiology
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DOI 10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.1.2
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References found in this work BETA

Impartial Reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Cornell University Press.
The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.

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