Studia Logica 105 (1):153-171 (2017)

Dustin Tucker
Colorado State University
A number of authors have taken a family of paradoxes, whose members trace back to theorems due either in whole or in part to Richard Montague, to pose a serious, possibly fatal challenge to theories of fine-grained, hyperintensional content. These paradoxes all assume that we can represent attitudes such as knowledge and belief with sentential predicates, and this assumption is at the heart of the purported challenge: the thought is that we must reject such predicates to avoid the paradoxes, and that hyperintensionality precludes such a rejection. In this paper I examine in more detail both parts of this thought. I first argue that while there are relatively few satisfactory alternatives to rejecting sentential attitude predicates, we cannot conclusively rule them all out—there are, at least, bullets that proponents of hyperintensionality can bite. I then argue that while most forms of hyperintensional content do in fact guarantee the existence of sentential attitude predicates, one relatively underexplored sort of content, due to Max Cresswell, does not. I thus conclude that while these Montagovian paradoxes present a serious challenge to nearly every popular theory of hyperintensionality, they do not on their own require that we retreat all the way to a familiar, coarse-grained, possible-worlds account of propositions.
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DOI 10.1007/s11225-016-9685-9
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References found in this work BETA

A Paradox Regained.D. Kaplan & R. Montague - 1960 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1 (3):79-90.
The Paradox of the Knower.C. Anthony Anderson - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (6):338-355.
Variations on a Montagovian Theme.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3377-3395.

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