No Justified Higher-Level Belief, No Problem

Abstract
It is somewhat popular to claim that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject has a justified belief that the premise supports the conclusion. Andrew Cling gives a novel argument for this requirement, which he calls “(JCC).” He claims that any otherwise plausible theory that rejects (JCC) is committed to distinguishing arbitrarily between arguments that provide doxastic justification for their conclusions and those that don’t. In this paper, I show that Cling’s argument fails, and I explain how the opponent of (JCC) can justify her apparently arbitrary distinctions
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 1053-8364  
DOI 10.5840/jpr_2011_18
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References found in this work BETA
Armchair Arguments Against Emergence.Achim Stephan - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (3):305-14.
On the Reality of Emergents.Charbel Nino El-Hani - 2002 - Principia 6 (1):51-87.
Putnam's Conception of Ontology.Sami Pihlström - 2006 - Contemporary Pragmatism 3 (2):1-13.

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