Paradoxes of intensionality

Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411 (2011)
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Abstract

We identify a class of paradoxes that is neither set-theoretical nor semantical, but that seems to depend on intensionality. In particular, these paradoxes arise out of plausible properties of propositional attitudes and their objects. We try to explain why logicians have neglected these paradoxes, and to show that, like the Russell Paradox and the direct discourse Liar Paradox, these intensional paradoxes are recalcitrant and challenge logical analysis. Indeed, when we take these paradoxes seriously, we may need to rethink the commonly accepted methods for dealing with the logical paradoxes

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Author Profiles

Richmond Thomason
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Dustin Tucker
Colorado State University

Citations of this work

Reference to Abstract Objects in Discourse.Nicholas Asher - 1993 - Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer.
A Theory of Structured Propositions.Andrew Bacon - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (2):173-238.
Logical Combinatorialism.Andrew Bacon - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):537-589.

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Quality and concept.George Bealer - 1982 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The development of logic.W. C. Kneale - 1962 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Martha Kneale.

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