Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545 (2010)

Authors
Chris Tucker
William & Mary
Abstract
Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P necessarily provides non-inferential justification for P. I show that dogmatism provides an intuitive explanation of four issues concerning non-inferential justification. It is particularly impressive that dogmatism can explain these issues because prominent epistemologists have argued that it can’t address at least two of them. Prominent epistemologists also object that dogmatism is absurdly permissive because it allows a seeming to provide justification even if the seeming was caused in some apparently inappropriate way. I conclude by disarming this objection.
Keywords dogmatism  phenomenal conservatism  speckled hen problem  perceptual justification  blindsight  associative visual agnosia  seemings
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00202.x
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.

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Citations of this work BETA

Experience, Seemings, and Evidence.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.
Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.
Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
Looks and Perceptual Justification.Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):110-133.

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