Weighing Reasons Against

Oxford Studies in Metaethics (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Ethicists increasingly reject the scale as a useful metaphor for weighing reasons. Yet they generally retain the metaphor of a reason’s weight. This combination is incoherent. The metaphor of weight entails a very specific scale-based model of weighing reasons, Dual Scale. Justin Snedegar worries that scale-based models of weighing reasons can’t properly weigh reasons against an option. I show that there are, in fact, two different reasons for/against distinctions, and I provide an account of the relationship between the various kinds of reason for and against. With this account in hand, we’ll see that Dual Scale has no problem weighing any kind of reason against.

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Chris Tucker
William & Mary