Synthese 191 (6):1-16 (2014)

Authors
Matthew Tugby
Durham University
Abstract
Notoriously, the dispositional view of natural properties is thought to face a number of regress problems, one of which points to an epistemological worry. In this paper, I argue that the rival categorical view is also susceptible to the same kind of regress problem. This problem can be overcome, most plausibly, with the development of a structuralist epistemology. After identifying problems faced by alternative solutions, I sketch the main features of this structuralist epistemological approach, referring to graph-theoretic modelling in the process. Given that both the categoricalists and dispositionalists are under pressure to adopt this same epistemological approach in light of the regress problem, this suggests that the categoricalist versus dispositionalist debate is best fought on metaphysical rather than epistemological grounds
Keywords Epistemology  Categorical properties  Regress  Nomic roles  Dispositions  Structuralism  Graph theory
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0316-y
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Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

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Citations of this work BETA

Dispositions.Michael Fara - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Dispositions.Sungho Choi - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Question of Realism for Powers.Lorenzo Azzano - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):329-354.
The Problem of Retention.Matthew Tugby - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).
New Powers for Dispositionalism.Giacomo Giannini - 2020 - Synthese (ST: New Foundations for Disposit):1-30.

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