Analysis 72 (4):723-731 (2012)

Authors
Matthew Tugby
Durham University
Abstract
Barker and Smart have argued that dispositional monism is just as susceptible to the ultimate regress problem as Armstrong’s contingent necessitation view of laws. In this response, I consider what implications this conclusion has for the dispositional essentialist project more generally. I argue that it is the monistic aspect of dispositional monism, rather than the dispositional essentialist aspect, which is the source of the problem raised by Barker and Smart. I then outline a version of dispositional essentialism which avoids the ultimate problem by avoiding the commitment to monism. Despite the article by Barker and Smart, it is not time to give up on the dispositionalist project yet
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ans112
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References found in this work BETA

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Platonic Dispositionalism.Matthew Tugby - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt071.
Powerful Qualities and Pure Powers.Henry Taylor - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1423-1440.
Making Sense of Powerful Qualities.Ashley Coates - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8347-8363.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

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