Delusions and Dispositionalism about Belief

Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628 (2011)
Abstract
The imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk-psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do competing accounts of belief
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01432.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,233
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities.Matthew Parrott - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1):axu036.
Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities.Matthew Parrott - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):271-296.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Delusions and Not-Quite-Beliefs.Maura Tumulty - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):29-37.
Are the Deluded Believers? Are Philosophers Among the Deluded?George Graham - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):337-339.
Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):329-336.
The Folk Epistemology of Delusions.Dominic Murphy - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):19-22.
Delusions: A Two-Level Framework.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 269--284.
Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & N. Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.
Delusions.A. W. Young - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):571-589.
Delusions and the Background of Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-11-04

Total downloads

34 ( #152,008 of 2,172,879 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #324,901 of 2,172,879 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums