Group beliefs

Synthese 91 (3):285-318 (1992)

Authors
Raimo Tuomela
University of Helsinki
Abstract
It is argued in this paper that there can be both normative and nonnormative, merely factual group beliefs. The former involve the whole social group in question, while the latter only relate to the distributions of personal beliefs within the group. The paper develops a detailed theory, called the positional account of group beliefs, to explicate normative, group-involving group beliefs. Normative group beliefs are characterized within this approach in terms of joint acceptances of views by the group members — or their representatives — acting in their right positions and tasks, and in a sense creating group commitments for all the members to accept (and keep accepting) the view in question. Also aggregate accounts of group belief are considered in the paper, especially the shared we-belief approach. Such aggregate accounts purport to account for merely factual group beliefs.
Keywords social epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413570
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References found in this work BETA

Modelling Collective Belief.Margaret Gilbert - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):185-204.
Belief and Acceptance.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1989 - Mind 98 (391):367-389.
A Theory of Social Action.Raimo Tuomela - 1988 - Noûs 22 (4):624-629.
Actions by Collectives.Raimo Tuomela - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:471-496.

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Citations of this work BETA

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Naturalizing Joint Action: A Process-Based Approach.Deborah Tollefsen & Rick Dale - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):385-407.
What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.
Social Knowing: The Social Sense of 'Scientific Knowledge'.Alexander Bird - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):23-56.

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