Phronesis 55 (2):170-190 (2010)

According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, our potential intellect is a purely receptive capacity. Alexander also claims that, in order for us to actualise our intellectual potentiality, the intellect needs to abstract what is intelligible from enmattered perceptible objects. Now a problem emerges: How is it possible for a purely receptive capacity to perform such an abstraction? It will be argued that even though Alexander's reaction to this question causes some tension in his theory, the philosophical motivation for it is a sound one. Rather than a calculation of actualities and potentialities, the doctrine of receptivity is supposed to explain how human beings come to grasp universal aspects of reality in an accurate manner
Keywords receptivity   abstraction   Alexander of Aphrodisias   accurate cognition   theory of intellect
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DOI 10.1163/156852810x489058
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References found in this work BETA

Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as the Good.Stephen Menn - 1992 - Review of Metaphysics 45 (3):543 - 573.
La Theorie Aristotelicienne de l'Intellect Agent.Michael Frede - 1996 - In Gilbert Romeyer Dherbey (ed.), Corps Et Ame: Sur le de Anima D’Aristote. Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin. pp. 377-90.
Philoponus: On Aristotle on the Intellect.Anthony Kenny & William Charlton - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 43 (173):532.

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Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect.John Sellars - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1):45-66.
Philosophy of the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle.Miira Tuominen - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):852-895.

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