We-intentions revisited

Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369 (2005)
This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the author’s earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are basically the same as before, the present account considerably adds to the earlier work. For one thing, it shows how we-intentions and joint intentions can arise in terms of the so-called Bulletin Board View of joint intention acquisition, which relies heavily on some underlying mutually accepted conceptual and situational presuppositions but does not require agreement making or joint intention to form a joint intention. The model yields categorical, unconditional intentions to participate in the content of the we-intention and joint intention (viz. shared we-intention upon analysis). The content of a we-intention can be, but need not be a joint action. Thus a participant alone cannot settle and control the content of the intention. Instead the participants jointly settle the content and control the satisfaction of the intention. These and some other features distinguish we-intentions from “action intentions”, viz. intentions that an agent can alone settle and satisfy. The paper discusses weintentions (and other “aim-intentions”) from this perspective and it also defends the author’s earlier account against a charge of vicious circularity that has been directed against it.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-7781-1
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References found in this work BETA
Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
How To Share An Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29 - 50.

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Citations of this work BETA
Framing Joint Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
Do Corporations Have Minds of Their Own?Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):265-297.
Early Developments in Joint Action.Celia Brownell - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):193-211.
Joint Intention, We-Mode and I-Mode.Raimo Tuomela - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

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