Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369 (2005)

Raimo Tuomela
Last affiliation: University of Helsinki
This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the author’s earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are basically the same as before, the present account considerably adds to the earlier work. For one thing, it shows how we-intentions and joint intentions can arise in terms of the so-called Bulletin Board View of joint intention acquisition, which relies heavily on some underlying mutually accepted conceptual and situational presuppositions but does not require agreement making or joint intention to form a joint intention. The model yields categorical, unconditional intentions to participate in the content of the we-intention and joint intention (viz. shared we-intention upon analysis). The content of a we-intention can be, but need not be a joint action. Thus a participant alone cannot settle and control the content of the intention. Instead the participants jointly settle the content and control the satisfaction of the intention. These and some other features distinguish we-intentions from “action intentions”, viz. intentions that an agent can alone settle and satisfy. The paper discusses weintentions (and other “aim-intentions”) from this perspective and it also defends the author’s earlier account against a charge of vicious circularity that has been directed against it.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-7781-1
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References found in this work BETA

Intentionality.J. R. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.

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Citations of this work BETA

Joint Actions and Group Agents.Philip Pettit & David Schweikard - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.
Collective Intentionality.David P. Schweikard & Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Naturalizing Joint Action: A Process-Based Approach.Deborah Tollefsen & Rick Dale - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):385-407.
Proxy Agency in Collective Action.Kirk Ludwig - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):75-105.

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