Dialogue 56 (2):227-239 (2017)

Authors
Michael-John Turp
University of Canterbury
Abstract
It is often argued that belief is partly constituted by a norm of truth. Most recent discussions have assumed that the norm is deontic concerning what may or ought to be believed. I criticize two proposals, one canvassed by Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi, and the other defended by Daniel Whiting. Instead, I argue in favour of an evaluative norm, according to which we would do well to believe the truth. I show that an evaluative norm fares better than its deontic competitors with respect to the demandingness of truth, the aim of truth, and epistemic blame. On soutient souvent que la croyance est en partie constituée par une norme de vérité. La plupart des discussions récentes ont supposé que la norme est déontique concernant ce qui peut ou doit être cru. Je critique deux propositions, l’une mise de l’avant par Krister Bykvist et Anandi Hattiangadi, et l’autre défendue par Daniel Whiting. Je plaide plutôt en faveur d’une norme évaluative selon laquelle nous ferions bien de croire la vérité. Je montre qu’une norme évaluative réussit mieux que ses concurrentes déontiques en ce qui a trait au caractère exigeant de la vérité, au but de la vérité et au blâme épistémique.
Keywords truth  epistemic value  epistemic normativity   nature of belief  aim of belief
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Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1017/s0012217316000706
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References found in this work BETA

Does Thought Imply Ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.
Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.
True to Life: Why Truth Matters.Michael Lynch & Maria Baghramian - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):137-140.
Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation.[author unknown] - 2005 - Philosophy 81 (317):547-552.

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