Logos and Episteme 11 (4):475-479 (2020)

John Turri
University of Waterloo
It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be improper yet permissible, and reproachable yet un-reproached. Assertion still has a factive norm.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme202011435
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