Are the folk agent-causationists?

Mind and Language 21 (5):597-609 (2006)
Abstract
Experimental examination of how the folk conceptualize certain philosophically loaded notions can provide information useful for philosophical theorizing. In this paper, we explore issues raised in Shaun Nichols' (2004) studies involving people's conception of free will, focusing on his claim that this conception fits best with the philosophical theory of agent-causation. We argue that his data do not support this conclusion, highlighting along the way certain considerations that ought to be taken into account when probing the folk conception of free will
Keywords FREE WILL
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00295.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,719
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
An Essay on Free Will.van Inwagen Peter - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Folk Psychology: Science and Morals.Joshua Knobe - 2008 - In Daniel Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Reassessed. Springer Press.
At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology.Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle - 2009 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):449-466.
Free Will and the Folk: Responses to Commentators.Shaun Nichols - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:305-320.
The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
92 ( #58,449 of 2,197,295 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #44,170 of 2,197,295 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature