Authors
Michael-John Turp
University of Canterbury
Abstract
In this paper, I defend the view that truth is a constitutive norm of belief formation, argue in favour of a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic evaluation and respond to possible objections. In §1, I argue that belief necessarily aims at truth. In §2, I defend a virtue-theoretic approach to epistemic evaluation in response to concerns about epistemic luck and doxastic control. In §3, I distinguish between evaluative and deontic norms in order to avoid the charge that we are subject to impossible epistemic demands. In §4, I study the relationship between epistemic norms, practical interests and ascriptions of knowledge.
Keywords Aim of Belief  Intellectual Virtue  Epistemic Evaluation  Doxastic Voluntarism  Epistemic Contextualism
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