Authors
John Turri
University of Waterloo
Abstract
I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary
Keywords A priori  Laurence BonJour  Saul Kripke
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00417.x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.
Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

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The Contingent a Priori: Kripke's Two Types of Examples.Heimir Geirsson - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):195 – 205.

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