Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344 (2011)
I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary
|Keywords||A priori Laurence BonJour Saul Kripke|
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Is Justification Easy or Impossible? Getting Acquainted with a Middle Road.Samuel Taylor - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2987-3009.
Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.
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