Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism

Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95 (2010)
Authors
John Turri
University of Waterloo
Abstract
In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose's influential argument that the knowledge account of assertion spells doom for invariantism and enables contextualism's ascendancy
Keywords Contextualism  Invariantism  Speech acts  Keith DeRose  Assertion  Knowledge account
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-2009-026
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Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
Prompting Challenges.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):456-462.
Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):178-207.

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