Fitting attitudes de dicto and de se

Noûs 44 (1):1-9 (2010)
Abstract
The Property Theory of attitudes holds that the contents of mental states --- especially de se states --- are properties. The "nonexistence problem" for the Property Theory holds that the theory gives the wrong consequences as to which worlds "fit" which mental states: which worlds satisfy desires, make beliefs true, and so on. If I desire to not exist, since there is no world where I have the property of not existing, my desire is satisfied in no worlds. In this paper I argue that the problem can be solved with a suitable account of how properties as mental states fit worlds. The solution relies on a distinction between to kinds of property-instantiation at worlds inspired by Fine's distinction between "inner" and "outer" truth.
Keywords Centered Worlds   Desire
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00728.x
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers.Kit Fine - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
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