Noûs 44 (1):1-9 (2010)
The Property Theory of attitudes holds that the contents of mental states --- especially de se states --- are properties. The "nonexistence problem" for the Property Theory holds that the theory gives the wrong consequences as to which worlds "fit" which mental states: which worlds satisfy desires, make beliefs true, and so on. If I desire to not exist, since there is no world where I have the property of not existing, my desire is satisfied in no worlds. In this paper I argue that the problem can be solved with a suitable account of how properties as mental states fit worlds. The solution relies on a distinction between to kinds of property-instantiation at worlds inspired by Fine's distinction between "inner" and "outer" truth.
|Keywords||Centered Worlds Desire|
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References found in this work BETA
The Problem of the Essential Indexical: And Other Essays.John Perry - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality.Roderick Chisholm - 1981 - University of Minnesota Press.
Citations of this work BETA
First-Person Propositions.Peter W. Hanks - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):155-182.
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