Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):275-283 (2010)
We find two main contemporary arguments for the infinitist theory of epistemic justification ('infinitism' for short): the regress argument (Klein 1999, 2005) and the features argument (Fantl 2003). I've addressed the former elsewhere (Turri 2009a). Here I address the latter.Jeremy Fantl argues that infinitism outshines foundationalism because infinitism alone can explain two of epistemic justification's crucial features, namely, that it comes in degrees and can be complete. This paper demonstrates foundationalism's ample resources for explaining both features.Section II clarifies the debate's key terms. Section III recounts how infinitism explains the two crucial features. Section IV presents Fantl's argument ..
|Keywords||Foundationalism Infinitism Epistemic justification Jeremy Fantl|
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References found in this work BETA
Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.
Reply to Ginet.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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