How Rational Level-Splitting Beliefs Can Help You Respond to Moral Disagreement

In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 239-255 (2020)
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Abstract

We provide a novel defense of the possibility of level-splitting beliefs and use this defense to show that the steadfast response to peer disagreement is not, as it is often claimed to be, unnecessarily dogmatic. To provide this defense, a neglected form of moral disagreement is analysed. Within the context of this particular kind of moral disagreement, a similarly neglected form of level-splitting belief is identified and then defended from critics of the rationality of level-splitting beliefs. The chapter concludes by showing that proponents of the steadfast response to peer disagreement can adopt this form of level-splitting belief in the context of these moral disagreements while exemplifying intellectual humility, rather than dogmatism.

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Author Profiles

Margaret Greta Turnbull
Gonzaga University
Eric Sampson
Rhodes College

Citations of this work

A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.

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