Philosophical Studies 163 (3):791-795 (2013)

Authors
John Turri
University of Waterloo
Abstract
I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding all our beliefs. I show how resources deployed in response to the most popular objection to infinitism, the original finite-mind objection, can be redeployed to address the two new objections
Keywords Infinitism  Finite-mind objection  Epistemic normativity  Epistemic justification  Peter Klein  Adam Podlaskowski  Joshua Smith
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9846-7
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Justification.William Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.
Knowledge in Perspective.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.Stewart Cohen - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:57-89.
Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.

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