Authors
James T. Turner Jr.
Anderson University
Abstract
A number of thinkers suggest that, given certain conditions, it’s possible that any concrete human nature could have been united hypostatically to the second Person of the Trinity. Oliver Crisp argues that a potency to have been possibly hypostatically united to the Logos is an important part of what it means for a human person to be made in the image of God. Against this line of reasoning, and building on an argument in print by Andrew Jaeger, I argue two things: first, that many metaphysics of human persons on offer fail to allow the Logos possibly to unite hypostatically to just any concrete human nature. And this is because, given the necessity of identity, every metaphysics that deploys an identity relation between a human person and her human nature or some essential component of her human nature fails to allow concrete human natures to be identical to any other person than they in fact are or else to lack some essential component that is identical to any other person than it in fact is. And, in the Incarnation, the Logos does not unite with a person. Second, supposing the preceding line of reasoning goes through, I argue that Oliver Crisp’s thesis about the imago Dei is mistaken, provided that it relies on a metaphysics of human persons that deploys an identity relation between a person and her concrete human nature or else some essential component of her concrete human nature.
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-019-09716-z
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Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):592-598.
Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Peter van Inwagen - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):138.
Modal Logic.James W. Garson - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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