Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple test

Synthese 192 (2):385-392 (2015)
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Abstract

An impressive case has been built for the hypothesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion, otherwise known as the knowledge account of assertion. According to the knowledge account, you should assert something only if you know that it’s true. A wealth of observational data supports the knowledge account, and some recent empirical results lend further, indirect support. But the knowledge account has not yet been tested directly. This paper fills that gap by reporting the results of such a test. The knowledge account passes with flying colors

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Author's Profile

John Turri
University of Waterloo

Citations of this work

The norm of assertion: Empirical data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):165-171.
Experimental work on the norms of assertion.John Turri - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (7):e12425.
Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.

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