Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):167-178 (2019)

Authors
John Turri
University of Waterloo
Abstract
Philosophers have debated whether it is possible to knowledgeably infer a conclusion from a false premise. For example, if a fan believes that the actress’s dress is blue, but the dress is actually green, can the fan knowledgeably infer “the dress is not red” from “the dress is blue”? One aspect of this debate concerns what the intuitively correct verdict is about specific cases such as this. Here I report a simple behavioral experiment that helps answer this question. The main finding is that people attribute knowledge in cases where a true conclusion is inferred from a false premise. People did this despite judging that the premise was false and unknown. People also viewed the agent as inferring the conclusion from the premise. In closely matched conditions where the conclusion was false, people did not attribute knowledge of the conclusion. These results support the view that the ordinary knowledge concept includes in its extension cases of knowledge inferred from false premises.
Keywords folk epistemology  inference  knowledge  truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1002/tht3.417
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Plea for Excuses.John Austin - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:1--30.
Thought.Gilbert Harman & Laurence BonJour - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (2):256.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Ways to Knowledge-First Believe.Simon Wimmer - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):552-568.
There Is No Knowledge From Falsehood.Ian Schnee - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):53-74.
When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?Andrew Cullison Neil Feit - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
Learning From Learning From Our Mistakes.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 51-70.
Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Martin Montminy - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475.
The Inspiration-Expiration Ratio During Truth and Falsehood.H. E. Burtt - 1921 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 4 (1):1.
Epicurus on Truth and Falsehood.Alexander Bown - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (4):463–503.
Knowledge with and Without Belief.Michael Veber - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):120-132.
Evaluative Effects on Knowledge Attributions.James R. Beebe - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Blackwell. pp. 359-367.
Truth and Falsehood, Mostly Falsehood.Albert E. Avey - 1949 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 23:47 - 67.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-06-08

Total views
118 ( #93,696 of 2,461,871 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #45,318 of 2,461,871 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes