Philosophia 43 (1):205-215 (2015)

The so-called Direct Argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism depends on a rule of inference called Rule A, a rule that says no one is even partly morally responsible for a necessary truth. While most philosophers think that Rule A is valid, Stephen Kearns has recently offered several alleged counterexamples to the rule. In the paper, I show that Kearns’ counterexamples are unsuccessful
Keywords Rule A  Direct Argument  Moral responsibility  Free will  Kearns  van Inwagen
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-014-9555-5
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,343
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Rule A.P. Roger Turner & Justin Capes - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):580-595.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Responsibility for Necessities.Stephen Kearns - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):307-324.
A Counterexample to A.Charles Hermes - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):387-389.
Truth and Moral Responsibility.P. Roger Turner - forthcoming - In Fabio Bacchini Massimo Dell'Utri & Stefano Caputo (eds.), New Advances in Causation, Agency, and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press.
Defending (a Modified Version of) the Zygote Argument.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):189-203.
A Contractualist Defense of Rule Consequentialism.Sanford Levy - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:189-201.
A Dilemma for Rule-Consequentialism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (1):141-150.
Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.
Boomerang Defense of Rule Following.Tomoji Shogenji - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):115-122.


Added to PP index

Total views
20 ( #534,390 of 2,445,323 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #232,632 of 2,445,323 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes