Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):419-448 (2012)

Jason Turner
University of Arizona
Ontological pluralism is the doctrine that there are different ways or modes of being. In contemporary guise, it is the doctrine that a logically perspicuous description of reality will use multiple quantifiers which cannot be thought of as ranging over a single domain. Although thought defeated for some time, recent defenses have shown a number of arguments against the view unsound. However, another worry looms: that despite looking like an attractive alternative, ontological pluralism is really no different than its counterpart, ontological monism. In this paper, after explaining the worry in detail, I argue that considerations dealing with the nature of the logic ontological pluralists ought to endorse, coupled with an attractive philosophical thesis about the relationship between logic and metaphysics, show this worry to be unfounded
Keywords Ontological pluralism  Free logic  Many-sorted logic  Metaphysics  Notational variants  Logical realism  Ontology
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-010-9167-x
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References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ways of Being.Joshua Spencer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):910-918.
The Explosion of Being: Ideological Kinds in Theory Choice.Peter Finocchiaro - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):486-510.
Ontological Superpluralism.Ben Caplan - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):79-114.

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