Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326 (2010)
I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification
|Keywords||virtue epistemology basing relation epistemic justification|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation.William Alston - 2005 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.
How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva Jr - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
Similar books and articles
The Role of Sensory Experience in Epistemic Justification: A Problem for Coherentism. [REVIEW]Richard Schantz - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):177-191.
The Basic Notion of Justification.Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Christopher Menzel - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (3):235-261.
Propositional Justification, Evidence, and the Cost of Error.Ram Neta - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):197–216.
The Interventionist Account of Causation and the Basing Relation.Kevin McCain - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):357-382.
Why Justification Matters.Declan Smithies - 2015 - In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 224-244.
Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism. [REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):666-672.
Added to index2009-08-03
Total downloads426 ( #5,049 of 2,154,175 )
Recent downloads (6 months)44 ( #6,360 of 2,154,175 )
How can I increase my downloads?