Practical and Epistemic Justification in Alston's Perceiving God

Faith and Philosophy 25 (3):290 - 299 (2008)
Authors
John Turri
University of Waterloo
Abstract
This paper clarifies and evaluates a premise of William Alston’s argument in Perceiving God. The premise in question: if it is practically rational to engage in a doxastic practice, then it is epistemically rational to suppose that said practice is reliable. I first provide the background needed to understand how this premise fits into Alston’s main argument. I then present Alston’s main argument, and proceed to clarify, criticize, modify, and ultimately reject Alston’s argument for the premise in question. Without this premise, Alston’s main argument fails.
Keywords Mystical perception  William Alston  Moore's Paradox
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ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI 10.5840/faithphil200825328
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Belief, Credence, and Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-13.

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