Perspectives in the Interpretation of Defeasible Reasoning

The Logica Yearbook 2013 2013:239-254 (2014)

Authors
Giacomo Turbanti
University of Pisa
Abstract
Non-monotonicity in logic is a symptom that may have many causes. In the formalisation of defeasible reasoning, an epistemic diagnosis has largely prevailed according to which some inferences are non-monotonic because they are provisionally drawn in the absence of relevant or complete information. The Gabbay-Makinson rules for cumulative consequence relations are a paradigmatic example of this epistemic approach. In this paper a different approach to defeasible reasoning is introduced, based on the idea of inferential perspectives. According to this approach, some inferences are non-monotonic because they are drawn as from another reasoner’s perspective. Rules are introduced and discussed for a Perspectival Calculus, which show both similarities and interesting differences with respect to cumulative systems.
Keywords Perspectival calculus  Inferential perspectives  Defeasible reasoning  Nonmonotonic logic  Substructural logic
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