Refutation by elimination

Analysis 70 (1):35-39 (2010)
John Turri
University of Waterloo
This paper refutes two important and influential views in one fell stroke. The first is G.E. Moore’s view that assertions of the form ‘Q but I don’t believe that Q’ are inherently “absurd.” The second is Gareth Evans’s view that justification to assert Q entails justification to assert that you believe Q. Both views run aground the possibility of being justified in accepting eliminativism about belief. A corollary is that a principle recently defended by John Williams is also false, namely, that justification to believe Q entails justification to believe that you believe Q.
Keywords Moore's Paradox
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anp138
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Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
Dissonance and Moorean Propositions.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):107-127.
Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe.Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):541 - 546.
Moore's Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.

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