Sustaining rules: a model and application

In Knowledge first: approaches in epistemology and mind (2017)
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I introduce an account of when a rule normatively sustains a practice. My basic proposal is that a rule normatively sustains a practice when the value achieved by following the rule explains why agents continue following that rule, thus establishing and sustaining a pattern of activity. I apply this model to practices of belief management and identifies a substantive normative connection between knowledge and belief. More specifically, I proposes one special way that knowledge might set the normative standard for belief: knowing is essentially the unique way of normatively sustaining cognition and, thereby, inquiry. In this respect, my proposal can be seen as one way of elaborating a “knowledge-first” normative theory.



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John Turri
University of Waterloo

Citations of this work

Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.
Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less.John Turri - 2016 - In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 124-134.
De Minimis Normativism: a New Theory of Full Aptness.J. Adam Carter - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):16-36.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.

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