The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587 (2009)
Abstract
The Consequence Argument is a staple in the defense of libertarianism, the view that free will is incompatible with determinism and that humans have free will. It is often thought that libertarianism is consistent with a certain naturalistic view of the world — that is, that libertarian free will can be had without metaphysical commitments beyond those pro- vided by our best (indeterministic) physics. In this paper, I argue that libertarians who endorse the Consequence Argument are forced to reject this naturalistic worldview, since the Consequence Argument has a sis- ter argument — I call it the Supervenience Argument — which cannot be rejected without threatening either the Consequence Argument or the naturalistic worldview in question
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802598652
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References found in this work BETA
Concepts of Supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
Causation by Disconnection.Jonathan Schaffer - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (2):285-300.
Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):257-70.

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