That's Outrageous

Theoria 79 (2):167-171 (2013)
I show how non-presentists ought to respond to a popular objection originally due to Arthur Prior and lately updated by Dean Zimmerman. Prior and Zimmerman say that non-presentism cannot account for the fittingness of certain emotional responses to things past. But presentism gains no advantage here, because it is equally incapable of accounting for the fittingness of certain other emotional responses to things past, in particular moral outrage
Keywords Dean Zimmerman  time  Arthur Prior  emotional fit  presentism
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12005
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A Defence of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1 (3):47-82.
Real Time.D. H. Mellor - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Thank Goodness That's Over.A. N. Prior - 1959 - Philosophy 34 (128):12 - 17.

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