Theoria 79 (2):167-171 (2013)
I show how non-presentists ought to respond to a popular objection originally due to Arthur Prior and lately updated by Dean Zimmerman. Prior and Zimmerman say that non-presentism cannot account for the fittingness of certain emotional responses to things past. But presentism gains no advantage here, because it is equally incapable of accounting for the fittingness of certain other emotional responses to things past, in particular moral outrage
|Keywords||Dean Zimmerman time Arthur Prior emotional fit presentism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics.Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.) - 2007 - Blackwell.
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